Just completed some preliminary work based on Buffett's famous 1999 speech at Sun Valley.
Buffett's speech can be found in this link.
Our work can be found here
Enjoy and prosper.
Monday, September 16, 2013
Thursday, August 29, 2013
Further one-legged update on the reporting season
Well folks, we are at the tail end of reporting season. I don't know about you, but I will be glad to give my one leg a much needed rest after this bout of ass-kicking.
23
August 2013
LYL results out. NPAT for FY 2014 will
be reduced by 50%. Price is getting interesting, but my call is that there could be slightly more pain for LYL given their position in the food-chain.
CAB analysis. Postulate that market is
overweighing the impact of ACCC recommendation to reduce 10% to 5% for payment
systems. The absolute downside is that
$45m being wiped from the top travels right to the bottom, reducing FCF from
$60m to $15m. Multiple compression follows as ROE of 20% becomes 5%, turning a
good business into a capital intensive substandard business. A compression of
multiple to 8 means the current market cap of $500m falls to $120m, which is a
75% drop. It is probably obvious that the outcome lies somewhere in between the
absolute downside and the current situation, therefore it will be helpful to
map out multiple scenarios in preparation for a price opportunity.
26
August 2013
SCD results. Operating cashflow of $2m, resulting in $7.2m
in cash, but there is $1.2m in tax liability and $1.6m tied up with banks as
security for bank guarantees. Factory
revalued downwards from $4.4m to $3.2m. Equity increased from $10.2m to
$12.6m. Service revenue increased from
$4.5 to $5.2m. Orders on hand $6.9m. One
customer made up 30% of revenue. I have covered this company in a previous post.
MTU results. Underlying margins appear to be
declining. ROA declining. Debt increased.
VTG results.
MLD results.
HSN results out.
27
August 2013
SRV results out. Operating cashflow of
$27m (after paying tax of $10m). Occupancy increasing. Cash on hand $99m.
Weakening AUD may boost earnings in FY14. 23 out of 38 immature floors will mature
in FY14. Opening another 8 large floors
which will boost total office space by 10%.
All USA floors are cash flow neutral and all expected to mature in FY14.
Occupancy rate is 88% as at June 2013 (USA recovery). Using $27m of FCF, with 10% RRR, assuming
zero growth for 10 years and adding unencumbered cash of $90m, yields $345m
value. Using dividend discount model, on
grossed up dividend figures, current market cap requires dividend to rise by 5%
every year, and terminal value of 10x grossed up dividend. Current price means that an investor gets
growth for free. I have held this for over 5 years now (first post here), and this long holding period has been helped immensely by a very competent management.
FLT results out. NPAT up 20%. Amazingly, current price implies growth of 5%
per annum in FCF for the next 10 years. I missed picking this up during the GFC for under $4, which means a 10-bagger has gone down the gurgler.
VEI results out. All metrics declined. Revenue down, gross
margins down, cashflow down, but surprisingly, wage expenses and doctor
payments were also down. FCF of $18m,
debt of $45m. DCF of $168m, less debt of $45m, yields $123m. 148m shares on
issue.
Examples of edge- information,
analysis, behavioural, structural. From Robert Robotti.
28
August 2013
TWD results out. Good yield. Exposure to housing in SE
Queensland. Worth a deeper look.
AMA results out. Revenue up, but EBIT
down. EBIT margin increased by 2%. Company
is debt free, with cash at $10m in August 2013.
Cashflow very strong at $10m. 332m shares. Net of cash, AMA priced for
no growth. Good to see a capable and honest CEO delivering on his promises.
IFM- founder CEO is leaving and has
sold all his shares.
WTF results out. Revenue down, profits down, and cashflow down.
But somehow market is valuing shares for 10% growth pa for 10 years. Madness.
MLB results out. Heavy in cash, new
management team coming in, but premium core business under pressure. Core business valued at 5x cashflow after
backing out cash chunk.
TTI results out. Debt still of
concern.
29
August 2013
VOC prelim results out. Revenue
increased to $66m. Profit down. Cashflow $18m, tax $3m. Free cashflow $15m. Fibre and DC showed tremendous growth. Cash balance of $14m will fully fund next year’s
$13.3m capex. Locked in recurring cashflow will pay off IRU obligations of
US$10m next year. USD hedge runs out in Dec 14, so some exposure to declining
AUD. FCF $15m, current market cap implies 5% growth pa for 10 years. Adding
debt to get EV of $220m, with FCF $15m, implies less than 10% growth pa. In the presentation, VOC stated that FY14
capex is in response to
customer demand, and this was repeated.
CTE Prelim report out. NPAT
$1.25m. Operating cashflow $1.9m. FCF $1.6m. Cash on hand $5.7m. No dividend
declared. Wage costs up $300k and
one-off capex spend. $2m tax losses
remaining. Record number of blood cord
clients. FCF estimated at $1.7m. Fair value at $23m, assuming no growth. But
note: “The Board is confident that subject to any unforeseen
circumstances, the benefits of its common infrastructure and operations systems
to support the business units will allow it to increase revenue, improve margins and overall financial performance
of the Company during the next financial year.”
IPP HY report out. Revenue period to period hardly moved. Not a good sign, as M’sia went backwards due
to elections, but increase in prepaid services plus record month in July, so
momentum will continue. HK shows very good growth and is close to breakeven,
locking in 4 out of 5 major developers. INA
growth slowing but still strong, whereas Singapore is lagging (still number 2).
REA trading at 14X revenue. IPP is trading at 12x revenue. We await next quarterly cashflow statement.
30
August 2013
DDR results out. Cashflow negative.
SST results out. Loans paid to other
entities??
UOS HY results out. I have held this for over 3 years, and posted about it here. Within the HY report, I found an amazing and pristine balance sheet:
|
Cash
|
$429m
|
|
Receivables
|
$159m
|
|
Inventories
|
$294m
|
|
Land held for property development
|
$20m
|
|
Property plant and equipment
|
$28.2
|
|
Investment properties
|
$566.8m
|
|
Total of Asset Items above
|
$1497m
|
|
Financial liabilities
|
$319m
|
Rent and parking fees for half year is
$20m. Shares on issue is 1.1b, market
cap is AUD$580m. Book value increased
15% over 6 months.
That's it folks. Time to sit back and think through ideas. By the way, the reading list has been updated, for those interested.
Disclosure: My family and I own shares in AMA, CTE, SRV, SCD, TWD, IPP, VOC and UOS.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
Friday, August 23, 2013
Thursday, August 22, 2013
One Legged Update on Reporting Season
1
August 2013
Reporting season kick-off.
GUD- under pressure, failing to invest
in tiring brands, dividend is too high, debt is mounting. Dropped from superstar status after 10 years of stirling results.
UBI- burning through $6.7m in cash
last 6 months, with $18m in the bank and some minor liabilities.
TCL- new CEO with lower pay, and 198%
rise in profits due to toll rises. Flagged increasing dividends.
2
August 2013
AMA paid off all debt with $10.8m, and
negotiated a new $6m facility. Given that balance on Dec 12 is close to $13m,
looks like it is a good deal (assuming they made no repayments in the 2nd
half). AMA’s cash position should be about $8m to $10m.
HSN upgraded profit due to currency
movements.
6
August 2013
UOS update- HY PBT is $110m. The good keeps giving. See here.
7
August 2013
Rumours of tie-in between MND and SSM
in the AFR. Not denied by SSM after ASX
please explain.
8
August 2013
ASW- flat results, not much growth, as expected- spinning back cash,
good ROE at 20%.
9
August 2013
Thorney Holdings increased stake in
SSM.
12
August 2013
COF FY results out today. As expected,
International Developments propped up the whole group. ID EBITDA running at
$18m per year. The whole group’s FCF is
about $11m after deducting $10m in restructuring payments. Trading at 5 times
EV.
WTF- heavily shorted- 10% shorted as
of 8 August 2013.
NWH- CFO resigned without resign.
Aftermarket announcement, not looking good.
AMM- results out, pretty impressive. Good indication for VOC results.
REA- another blistering result. Pity about the price
14
August 2013
CRZ- good results, $90m cashflow.
Priced at $2.4b implies growth rate of 15% per annum for 10 years.
CSL- results as expected. R & D
over US$450m pa now, and cashflow still strong at $1.3b.
CBA- results reaffirmed position as
the highest quality bank.
UGL and WOR providing better outlook
in mining services space.
15
August 2013
IRI results flat. Cannot understand the price.
SRX results out. Operating cashflow of
$24m but capitalised $12m in R & D. Market cap of over $720m implies 20% pa compounded growth for 10 years. Very optimistic
price.
16
August 2013
ONT results out. Slightly better than
expected. Fair valuation at $4 compared
to $6.50 SP. Management is top class, reports are easy to read, and commentary is clear and relevant with very little corporate geekspeak. Very rare management quality.
19
August 2013
Question of the day: why do you
rationally believe that you have an edge to beat the market?
20
August 2013
EAX results out. Top line showing good
growth. But decision to capitalise $1.2m of commissions is questionable. Expensing these payments would have resulted
in NPAT being down yoy.
21
August 2013
SGH- another acquisition. WIP is now
$300m, ROE slightly up to 16%. Disaster
waiting to happen.
SEK- FY results with significant
gains. FCF now $160m and current pricing
implies growth of 10% per year for next ten years. Reasonable pricing amongst all these network effect plays.
BYL- record FY results. Flagged no
growth for 2014. Mentioned large infrastructure spend for WA. Bodes well for
NWH.
FAN- continues to deteriorate. ROE is
13% and no longer a superstar.
COF- director picked up 500k shares.
Serious money.
22
August 2013
NWH results out. Evidence of margin compression, and affected
by mining downturn. Management has countered by cutting headcount by 50%
(showing in the cashflow) and diversifying into other sectors such as oil and
gas where they just completed their first project. Outlook is good, with 60% of $1.2b of work
already secured, and over $3b of works in tender. Debt has gone up slightly,
and cashflow has crunched in the second half, even though overall cashflow is
still healthy. At this stage, NWH is unlikely
to suffer solvency problems, and is holding up well in difficult
conditions. However, it is priced as if
it will be going out of business soon.
Current multiples of below 5 allows 50% drop in cashflow and NPAT.
CDA results out. Downgrade to short term earnings outlook.
PEA results out. Lots of contract terminations and variations. This puts question mark over reliability of cashflows, which is required to balance out mediocre return on capex spend.
IMF results out. $35m of receivables subject to appeal. Not exactly conservative accounting.
CMI results out. Debt free. Declared dividend. $10m operating
cashflow, $8m FCF. TJM continues to lose
money, but revenue is up. NPAT of
$10m. Trading at PE 5 and 5x Operating
Cashflow.
23
August 2013
FFI results out. The food operation has improved PBT to $3m,
but food business also incurred $1.5m in capex. Cashflow healthy, dividend declared.
Tuesday, July 16, 2013
Reading List
Dear readers,
If you are getting restless and bored, here is a reading list for your kind consideration.
I will be grateful for any recommendations to add to the list.
Yours truly,
One Legged
If you are getting restless and bored, here is a reading list for your kind consideration.
I will be grateful for any recommendations to add to the list.
Yours truly,
One Legged
Monday, June 10, 2013
Book Review- Swiss Made
Reading this now. Fascinating. Review to come.
Update: I have always been fascinated by the relatively large proportion of multinationals and brand names originating from Switzerland. This book provides a cursory glance and examines some salient historical, geographical, cultural, and political factors. My main take on the causes of Swiss success is the ability of its citizens and businesses to adapt to constant change over an extended period of time, due to a willingness to absorb and integrate foreign talent, a decentralised political structure, and the lack of a domestic market forcing its entrepreneurs to deal with brutal competition right from the outset. The ability to absorb and integrate foreign talent has occupied a greater part of my thinking when considering the future of countries such as the USA and China. Even Lee Kuan Yew has stated that he believes the ability to integrate foreign talent to be vital to the future success of the USA, and this same factor may prove to be a problem for China moving forward. I am nowhere near a stage where I can form strong opinions, but this book is certainly a step in the right direction.
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
Confession Box 5 June 2013
On 4 June 2013, I sold my FGE holdings for $4.48.
This came in the aftermath of FGE's announcement of an acquisition. Despite massive cash holdings and a weakening AUD, management decided to fund the acquisition through a mixture of debt and equity.
My rationale for purchase of FGE was first set out here, and also in a subsequent post here. Events subsequent to my purchase have eroded my margin of safety in this investment. Nevertheless, I wish to make it clear that the purchase was an error on my part as it was based on inadequate due diligence. If I had done some better due diligence, the events subsequent could have been mostly foreseen.
The half yearly results in February 2013 clearly disclosed severe margin crimp, given that revenues increased 120% yet NPAT only increased by 60%, with NPAT margins in single digits. This arose as a direct result of increasing reliance on low margin work from the power division. Subsequent contract awards in this space only heightened the risks involved. My attitude to this was blase to say the least.
Then Clough decided to sell all its shares in FGE, which further weakened the investment thesis. However, since the probability of a takeover at higher prices was a free option in my investment thesis, I brushed off this event without further investigation.
The unusual nature of the Taggart acquisition prompted me to do a much belated due diligence on the management team, particularly David Simpson, the MD. One of my Google searches turned up several articles on the appointment of David Simpson on a very lucrative pay package, which was acknowledged by the FGE board (then) as being on the high side. The sad thing is that all of these articles predate my purchase, and I did not read a single one at any time prior or at the time of purchase.
In a nutshell, Simpson was paid $750k to sign on, with a yearly salary of $1,000,000, together with short term incentives of 2 tranches of $500,000 payable on achievement of an increase of 10% EPS from one period to another. This is such a ridiculously low hurdle for such a huge payoff, it amounts to a joke.
Briefly, David Simpson's bio:
This came in the aftermath of FGE's announcement of an acquisition. Despite massive cash holdings and a weakening AUD, management decided to fund the acquisition through a mixture of debt and equity.
My rationale for purchase of FGE was first set out here, and also in a subsequent post here. Events subsequent to my purchase have eroded my margin of safety in this investment. Nevertheless, I wish to make it clear that the purchase was an error on my part as it was based on inadequate due diligence. If I had done some better due diligence, the events subsequent could have been mostly foreseen.
The half yearly results in February 2013 clearly disclosed severe margin crimp, given that revenues increased 120% yet NPAT only increased by 60%, with NPAT margins in single digits. This arose as a direct result of increasing reliance on low margin work from the power division. Subsequent contract awards in this space only heightened the risks involved. My attitude to this was blase to say the least.
Then Clough decided to sell all its shares in FGE, which further weakened the investment thesis. However, since the probability of a takeover at higher prices was a free option in my investment thesis, I brushed off this event without further investigation.
The unusual nature of the Taggart acquisition prompted me to do a much belated due diligence on the management team, particularly David Simpson, the MD. One of my Google searches turned up several articles on the appointment of David Simpson on a very lucrative pay package, which was acknowledged by the FGE board (then) as being on the high side. The sad thing is that all of these articles predate my purchase, and I did not read a single one at any time prior or at the time of purchase.
In a nutshell, Simpson was paid $750k to sign on, with a yearly salary of $1,000,000, together with short term incentives of 2 tranches of $500,000 payable on achievement of an increase of 10% EPS from one period to another. This is such a ridiculously low hurdle for such a huge payoff, it amounts to a joke.
Briefly, David Simpson's bio:
Diploma of Law, Masters
of Law and Management. Progression
through lawyering as corporate counsel in three previous companies. Started career as
a paralegal in ABB in early 1990s, then corporate counsel in Leighton, and then moved to UGL as corporate counsel, then as manager of one of UGL's divisions, before taking on the post of MD in FGE.
In other words, you have a corporate lawyer with very little technical/engineering background leading an engineering company, with a $1 million dollar short term bonus dangling in front of him. All he needs to do is increase diluted EPS by 10%. Upon his appointment, the old guard at FGE left and promptly sold all their shares in the mid $5s.
Once I saw this, everything fell into place:
1. The Taggart acquisition was structured with an upfront cash payment, funded by debt. Subsequent milestones payments are paid via 70/30 mixture of cash and shares. The upfront cash payment goes straight to the balance sheet, and does not affect earnings, but the target acquisition earnings are accretive immediately. Subsequent dilutive milestone payments in shares do not affect the MD's short term bonus.
2. Continual contract awards in the low margin power divisions. Margins are being sacrificed for the sake of volumes, which is very dangerous in any business other than mature businesses with incumbent management with demonstrated experience in a low margin high volume environment.
Given this trend, I see a distinct possibility of continual erosion of my margin of safety in this investment, with gearing up of the balance sheet and increasingly high capital requirements to maintain low margin businesses in the power area and underground coal mining, coupled with integration risks of Taggart, together with some massive headwinds hitting the mining services sector. Plus a huge risk with a corporate boardroom MD granted questionable incentives.
Taken to extreme, increasing debt and low margins are recipes for very sudden implosion, which brings us back to Rule Number 1.
This investment yielded 19% returns over a 6 month period, which was again just down to pure dumb luck. My penance was an immediate indepth management review of all portfolio holdings.
Labels:
FGE,
Forge Group,
management,
Taggart,
Value investing
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)