Investing does not provide much of a "break". I am making the best of the situation, and taking a rest, so my time spent on investing is much reduced during this period.
Given the events in the US at the end of the year, the markets and the portfolios under my management have been given a fillip. Though pleasing, this means that buying opportunities are being reduced with the daily rise in prices.
I have a suspicious feeling that finding bargains may not be as easy in 2013. Nevertheless, there is no reason not to be fully prepared.
To my readers, best wishes for the coming year, and may your portfolio be headed steadily towards the top right hand corner!
Tuesday, January 8, 2013
Monday, December 10, 2012
Another angle on FGE plus tidbit on CMI
Clough Limited (CLO) is another mining services company listed on the ASX and exposed to the oil and gas sector. On 11 December 2012, CLO announced that it had renewed a $200m debt facility. How is this relevant to FGE?
CLO is the biggest shareholder of FGE, holding roughly 36% of shares in FGE. As at June 2012, CLO had $146m cash on its balance sheet. The last substantial shareholder
notice published by FGE in May 2012 showed that CLO added a further 3% in compliance with the creep provisions
of the Corporations Act.
In 2012, CLO made $42m in profits and is currently
trading at PE 15. FGE has $130m cash as at June 2012, and has had a good half
with NPBT forecasted at $50m. If CLO takes $100m of its cash, combined with
$130m of FGE cash, totalling $230m, it could afford to take over FGE for up to
$360m. The current market cap for FGE is $335m. Alternatively, CLO could just
use $200m from its debt facility to do the same thing, and after the takeover, repay
the debt in full with FGE’s cash plus a bit of its own. With CLO’s huge
blocking and controlling stake, a rival bidder is very unlikely.
An acquisition by CLO will be
immediately and significantly PE accretive without any synergistic costs
savings. In fact, CLO’s earnings would more than double, and its margins will
increase by about 50% with FGE in its fold, and this can be done with minimal
dilution.
All these are pretty obvious, so what
am I missing?
My best guess from CLO’s perspective
is that there is no hurry since CLO has a large blocking stake which renders
the possibility of a rival bidder vanishingly small. CLO can take advantage of
lower prices using the creep provisions. In the current environment for mining
services, it is also prudent for CLO to preserve its cash rather than making
any bold moves. CLO’s largest South African shareholder is probably loath to
risk contributing more capital to CLO and prefers CLO to keep a clean healthy
balance sheet.
A takeover by CLO has been long
anticipated and speculated by the market, at much higher prices for FGE than
the present. These speculations have
intensified with recent management changes at FGE, and the recent exercise of
options by outgoing management at prices up to $5.60 perhaps indicate that they
do not see any potential upside beyond $5.60 for FGE due to the potential for a
takeover at prices below that.
It will be interesting days ahead for FGE.
Lastly, a little tidbit on CMI, with the newest director, Stephen Lonie, spending over $120,000 of his own money buying up 65000 shares in recent days.
Disclosure: The author owns shares in FGE and CMI.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
Forge Limited (FGE)
I recently tweeted that I am
examining 3 shares which I believe are undervalued.
The third of these is Forge Limited (FGE), and I am forced to publish this earlier than expected as the company has jumped the gun on me (explanation below).
The third of these is Forge Limited (FGE), and I am forced to publish this earlier than expected as the company has jumped the gun on me (explanation below).
An extreme valuation sometimes makes purchase decisions very
easy. The investor is given such a large margin of safety in relation to the
purchase price such that not many things need to go right to get a decent
return. On 5 December 2012, FGE provided this opportunity when it released an
earnings update for FY13.
FGE told the market that it expected to make Net Profit
Before Tax of $90m to $100m for FY13. Give that 5 months of FY13 have already
elapsed, and given that FGE stated that it expected the NPBT to be split evenly
between two halves, at least $40m of NPBT has already been earned.
By way of background, FGE is an engineering and construction
company providing mining services to the mining industry in Australia and
Africa. As a group, mining services companies on the ASX have been deserted en
masse by investors fearing the end of the commodities boom and a contraction in
mining investments.
In the words of Jamie Mai, extracted from the book Hedge Fund Market Wizards by Jack Schwager, “markets tend to overdiscount the uncertainty related to identified risks.” Further, “although markets are generally good at estimating the magnitude of a contingent liability, they are often poor at evaluating outcomes probabilistically.”
In the words of Jamie Mai, extracted from the book Hedge Fund Market Wizards by Jack Schwager, “markets tend to overdiscount the uncertainty related to identified risks.” Further, “although markets are generally good at estimating the magnitude of a contingent liability, they are often poor at evaluating outcomes probabilistically.”
It is my view that in the case of FGE, the market has
overdiscounted both the rate and the magnitude of future earnings decline.
Valuation
FGE has 87 m shares on issue. At AUD$3.85 cents, market cap is AUD$335m.
Earnings
Earnings update on 5 December 2012- NPBT$100m. NPAT $70m. At
least $40m of NPBT has already been made to date. Backing out cash of $130m on the balance
sheet (as at June 2012), this is effectively PE 3. An investor is paying about
$210m for all future cashflows from FGE, bearing in mind that as at June 2012,
FGE had an order book of $900m, and since June 2012, FGE has announced further
contract wins totalling $360m.
A good part of FGE fortunes are tied to the actions of RIO,
FMG and Roy Hill. These companies are racing against time to expand their iron
ore output before iron ore prices decline further.
Going through the financial statements, variable costs made
up 60% of revenue in 2012, up from 46% in 2011. However, wage costs as a
percentage of revenue have declined from 37% in 2011 to 27% in 2012. This lower level of fixed costs provides a
safety buffer in the event of a contraction in revenues. At current prices, even if FGE's earnings declined by 50% (which is quite a distinct possibility), earnings multiple are still in the lowish single digits.
The market is pricing FGE as if it will experience an earnings decline to the vicinity of $20m per annum. This is not impossible, but for what it is worth, I believe that the chances of this happening in the next 5 years is quite remote. The more likely scenario is that within the next 5 years, total free cashflow from FGE will exceed the share price being paid today.
Disclosure: The author owns shares in FGE.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
Coffey International Limited
I recently tweeted that I am examining 3 shares which I believe are undervalued.
The second of these is Coffey International Limited (COF).
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
The second of these is Coffey International Limited (COF).
COF is an engineering consultancy company with a history
going back to 1959. It listed on the ASX in 1990. The company went on a
diworsefication spree from 2003 to 2008, acquiring more than 30 businesses from
a combination of cashflow, capital raisings and debt, until the GFC stopped
this stupidity. Faced with heavy losses from write-offs, coupled with heavy
staff turnover, management changed hands in March 2011. Since then, current
management has restructured the business by selling and discontinuing non
profitable businesses, cutting down debt, and improving operational
efficiencies.
In a nutshell, the core businesses of COF are quite
stable. This arises from its entrenched
relationships, embedded expertise and geographical reach, aided by a very
fragmented customer base. Not unlike the story of GEICO, management is engaging
in cancer surgery, stripping away the useless parts and retaining the good
businesses at its core. Management’s
efforts are starting to gain traction- costs are coming down, margins are being
maintained or improved, staff turnover is reduced.
Due to disappointing results in the last few years, and an
anticipated slowdown in mining investments, I believe that the market is now overdiscounting
near term uncertainties for COF, and overlooking the underlying trend
improvements in COF’s businesses.
Valuation
COF has 256 m shares on issue. At AUD$0.32 cents, market cap is AUD$82m. Operating cashflow is AUD$21m per annum,
giving P/Cashflow multiple of 4. If I
add $66m of net debt, the enterprise value/ cashflow multiple is 7. Given COF’s
long operating history and stability of its revenues, a reasonable valuation is
about 10 times multiple. Hence current
market price is a 30% discount, assuming no costs improvements and no revenue
or margin growth. Recent update by
management on 4 December 2012 appears to indicate that revenues are holding
whilst costs are still being removed, although the outlook for the second half
is still uncertain.
Earnings
Trailing PE is 11 based on NPAT of $7m derived by adding
back $37m worth of write-offs. At this
stage, due to write-offs and restructuring, earnings multiple is not a reliable
indicator of the value for COF. In the
long run, we expect the earnings to match the cashflow, which will bring
earnings multiple into the low single digit figures.
Balance Sheet
As at June 2012, COF has net debt of $66m. There are $9m in franking credits.
Disclosure: The author owns shares in COF.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
Monday, December 3, 2012
CMI Limited
I recently tweeted that I am examining 3 shares which I believe are undervalued.
The first of these is CMI Limited.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
The first of these is CMI Limited.
CMI operates two divisions, Electricals and TJM.
Electricals
revenue for FY 12 is $74m, returning EBIT of $21.5m. TJM revenue for FY 12 is $40m, but EBIT is only $1m.
Electricals are facing headwinds due to declining coal
sector investments in Qld, and also subdued industrial and housing activity.
TJM has a lot of room to improve when performance is
compared with ECB and ARP. TJM is an
established high quality brand with steady revenue, however the division is
saddled with high costs due to the number of distribution centres, and management appears to
be trying to contain costs by moving manufacturing to China. ECB and ARP both generated EBIT margins in
the mid teens, and if TJM can do just 10% EBIT, the EBIT from this division
will go up 4x. I suspect that the TJM division is being dressed up for an
eventual sale, and logical acquirers are AMA and ARP.
The problem with CMI has been management’s treatment of
minorities over the last several years, culminating in litigation brought by
Troy Harry last FY. With the death of long time owner Catalan, and succession
to his daughter Leanne Catalan, the situation with management is still less
than optimal, especially as management owns a controlling stake. We suspect management’s actions account for
the perennial share price underperformance, made worse by the previous unwieldy
structure of having two classes of shares.
The structure has since been rationalised this FY following litigation
brought by minority shareholders. There
is still some overhang of a big parcel of shares bought by Leanne allegedly in
contravention of the provisions of the Corporations Act which was the subject
of litigation at the Takeover Panel. This
matter is still subject to appeal, although I believe this is unlikely to matter
in the big scheme of things.
Valuation
CMI has 38.2m shares on issue. At AUD$1.70 cents, market cap is AUD$58m. Operating cashflow is AUD$9.5m, giving
P/Cashflow multiple of 6, and the multiple is slightly less than 7 if we include
debt of about $8m. Normalised EBIT is about $20m. A very conservative 5x EBIT
puts CMI at AUD$100m. Current AUD$58 implies a 42% discount to a very
conservative valuation. Even if EBIT drops by half to $10m, the EBIT multiple of 6 is still within conservative territory.
Earnings
Trailing PE (normalised without write-off based on NPAT of
$14m) is 4. Outlook given on 30 November 2012 appears to
indicate that Electricals is holding and TJM is improving. Market cap of AUD$58m allows an earnings
deterioration by 50% to $7m, and even
then, the PE is still a lowly 8. This provides a degree of margin of safety
Balance Sheet
As at June 2012, CMI has $8m in bank debt. This is more than covered by operating
cashflow of $9m. There are $16m in franking credits. There is also an
impairment provision for a third party loan of $17m which has been written off
to zero, but which I am confident will result in some recovery. There is a
personal guarantee for $2.5m for this loan which CMI is now pursuing. Working capital is about $37m which is about 1/3 of sales, and I expect there is some room for improvement here to boost the balance sheet.
Disclosure: The author owns shares in CMI.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
Monday, November 26, 2012
Seeking Patience
"All man's miseries derive from not being able
to sit quietly in a room alone.” Pascal, Blaise
Patience is a great asset, and I
believe, a major differentiator of performance between fund managers. Every one of us are blessed (or cursed,
depending on your viewpoint) with different abilities. It is a simple logical
inference that the more actions we take, the more mistakes we are likely to
make. This is an undeniable fact in the highly probabilistic world of business
and investing.
Once again, patience is a simple concept in
theory, but very difficult in practice. As some pundits say, even inaction is an action by itself. Stock prices can meander for years
before a sudden spurt brings prices back to fair value. The time period for such spurts varies between
2% to 9% of the total holding period. So in a holding period of say 5 years, the share price performance comes in a period lasting only 1.2 to 5.4 months. In the meantime, glamour stocks are
flying, and other opportunities appears to be zipping by while your own stocks
do nothing. A similar situation arises when we attempt to resist the temptation
to sell stocks which have increased in price. Let your winners run, they say.
It is not an easy task to maintain equanimity and objectivity in such
situations.
Needless to say, this week has been
quite trying on my patience.
22
October 2012
Listening to TGA presentation. TEF
aiming for $50m critical mass, funded by debt. Both TEF and Cashfirst to start
major contributions in 2014 and 2015. One person kiosks reminds me of Bank
Rakyat. Pretty significant competitive
advantage once fully rolled out. NCML getting some major exposure to QBE, CBA
and SDRO. Rentals maintaining excellent
performance and spitting back cash to fund other lines. I can easily envisage a situation within 3 to
5 years when TEF, Cashfirst and NCML collectively contributes as much as
Rentals, and a doubling of EPS.
23
October 2012
Rereading Competition Demystified by
Greenwald.
UOA DEV Q3 results out. Total assets
increased by 13.5% to MYR$2430m. Total
liabilities increased by 21% to MYR$357m. Total equity increased by 12.3% to
MYR$2072m. MYR$88m NPAT for quarter. 4
quarters=MYR$300m-$360m. UOS 66% share is MYR$200-$240m=AUD$60m to $80m. On a
lowly PE 8 range, UOS should have a valuation range of AUD$480m to AUD$640m,
and this ignores rental from investment properties held at parent level. A
second way to value is taking UOADB’s market cap of MYR$2.1b, of which 66% is
MYR$1.4b=AUD$460m, which ignores UOA REIT and also all assets held at parent
company level. Every which way I cut it, there is a significant undervaluation. A slap in the face type of undervaluation.
Assessing CAB- bearing in mind that the market usually overdiscounts near term uncertainties. AGM on Wednesday 28 November 2012.
26
October 2012
IPP still headed the right way. http://blog.iproperty.com.my/ceo-blog/the-iproperty-group-is-gaining-weight/ Cannot wait for this baby to turn cashflow
positive.
IPP extended leadership in HK-
arguably the most important of all its markets. Waiting for news that the other
3 property developers have joined the party, and it will all be game over for
the competitors. HK will make more money than Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore
combined. IPP revenue running at AUD$15m per annum now. Compared to REA in 2003 with AUD$9m
revenue. In 2004 REA revenue jumped to
AUD$19m, and it started making a profit.
REA revenue is AUD$280m in 2012 with penetration of 60% of RE spend.
IPP currently at 5% penetration of RE
spend. A six-fold increase to 30% RE spend will online will see revenue at
AUD$90m. Current market cap for IPP is AUD$160m.
27
October 2012
CSL- profit guidance up 20% despite
currency headwinds. This is a sad miss for an entry price below $30 in February
2012. The opportunity cost is a whopping 66% gain forgone, not counting
dividends.
AMA- CEO address. Appears to be
squeezing out growth and good performance from all divisions, especially
FluidDrive with quarterly EBIT up a stunning 200% pcp.
Disclosure: The author owns shares in AMA, IPP, UOS and TGA.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
Activity Update
Mulling over my activity over the last
7 days since my last blog post, I am reminded of John Arnold’s famous quote:
“War is sometimes described as long periods of
boredom punctuated by short moments of excitement. History is often similar, if
rather safer.”
I would tentatively venture that
investing is similar. After all, history
is a record of the endeavours of humankind. Business is but one small facet of
these endeavours. Logically, the same process should apply. My investing is characterised by a never-ending search for ideas, many of which are discarded. Looking back over my notes, good ideas that are investable are rare, about one every 3 months where I am concerned.
Here is a summary of what I have been
up to over the last 7 days, gleaned from my journal.
14
November 2012
Thinking about businesses with
longevity, a long compounding trajectory. Growth rates should be moderate, should
not be rapidly changing. Compounding
machines. Need to learn more about
financial history, especially businesses that have been around and unchanged
for a long time. Very few businesses can
stand the ravages of time and competition.
Banking and law are two examples. BHP is another. Needless to say, adaptability is crucial.
Continued going through list of
shares.
15
November 2012
ABS data shows MV vehicle sales for
Oct down 2.8% from Sept, and SUV down 3%. Data conflicts with FCAI figures
published at the start of the month.
Investigated cause for difference.
Continued going through list of
shares.
16
November 2012
Looking closely at CMI Ltd. TJM has a
good brand, but management is stuffing up via wrong business model. Electricals
facing some serious headwinds.
19
November 2012
Boom in shale gas- LNG transport-
shipping.
Finished treasure hunt project for
industrials.
20
November 2012
TGA results out- NCML continues to
drag- lesson= large acquisitions seldom work. Cashflow strong. Rentals steady.
Arrears/impairments down. Cashfirst and TEF looking promising. TEF being funded
entirely by debt. Market did not like
result. Dividend lifted. No long term reason to sell but unsure of whether to
add more.
FFI- catching up with news. Chairman's presentation and latest leasing deal are positive news as value is unlocked from the land parcel. Attempting to do a revised valuation.
FFI- catching up with news. Chairman's presentation and latest leasing deal are positive news as value is unlocked from the land parcel. Attempting to do a revised valuation.
21
November 2012
Considering the implications of the US
becoming energy independent, and the many projects in the pipeline for
LNG. A long tailwind. Thinking of
industries that will benefit from declining input costs of LNG. There are 4
obvious candidates on the ASX that my non-creative mind can think of.
LYL management gave an unusual downward guidance over next 2 years. Mining services slowing down rapidly. Hats off to a management with impeccable integrity.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
LYL management gave an unusual downward guidance over next 2 years. Mining services slowing down rapidly. Hats off to a management with impeccable integrity.
Disclaimer: the content of this post is not to be relied on as financial advice. It contains my personal opinion only, plus facts that I cannot verify to be accurate. Do your own research and seek financial advice where appropriate. I have made many mistakes in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
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